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by the belief in magic forces which may be utilized by man than by the belief in the free activity of gods."

I trust that even this very inadequate abstract of the contents of Dr. Westermarck's work may be sufficient to make evident the value of this great contribution to learning.

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JUSTICE AND LIBERTY. A Political Dialogue. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1908. Pp. 229.

The three speakers in this political dialogue may be described, with a certain freedom but not altogether inaccurately, as an aristocratic and a democratic socialist and a defender of the existing order. In relation to their ideas, my position is paradoxical. While I have a strong disposition to agree with everything that the two idealists say in condemnation of the present industrial anarchy, which they describe as a mixture of oligarchy and ochlocracy, I think that, as against them, the practical-minded banker has on the whole the best case. In none of the systems outlined do I find justice a conspicuous feature; but Stuart seems to me right in what he says about liberty. "No free society would ever tolerate Collectivism at all" (p. 136). "I insist that even an unskilled laborer benefits by and consciously enjoys his freedom under the present *régime*" (p. 141). "There would, I am sure, be less freedom, in a very real sense, under Collectivism, than there is now, not only for the few but for the many" (p. 143).

Again, the Utopian aristocrat Harington seems to me to have a better case than the academical democrat Martin when he declines to sacrifice the best that the highest faculties can produce under the condition of leisure for the sake of a more evenly diffused material comfort. His aristocracy, he says, would see that an appropriate share of labor and talent was devoted to noble and beautiful things. Martin replies that he does not know whether the love of beautiful and noble things is a permanent factor or a transitory phase in human nature, but he hopes that it is permanent; and if the instinct for art persists, then it will have a healthier and nobler development under his social democracy because it will be the spontaneous

outcome of popular forces, and not the foster-child of patrons. But in this society all are to do task-work under public authority. "In a well-ordered community," it is laid down (p. 93), "no able-bodied person ought to receive anything except as the direct reward of his labor." Works of art and imagination are apparently to be produced only by persons who devote their spare time to them. This means that they are not conceived as essential ends of human society.

Martin, however, in spite of temporary appearances, is not much worse than the others on this point. All agree at bottom in making industrial production the essence. Harington, for example, would breed systematically for minute specialization of function, except in his highest class; and this is only an apparent exception, for the business of his aristocrats is to live and govern so as to make such a society work. They are not to resemble Plato's guardians, but "Renaissance princes." Thus their demand for splendor of life would call forth intense industrial activity in all other ranks. These are to consist of various kinds of worker-castes. Martin would breed for a high average of capacity; but to him justice seems to require that reward should be estimated, as far as possible, not by product but by effort. "In that way one would discourage deliberate idleness." "A weaker or stupider man, working harder than one who is stronger and more intelligent, but producing less, ought to receive a higher wage" (p. 101). For labor at the same occupation this may have to be modified in deference to the economists by "the principle of efficiency"; but application will be all the more rigorous as between different occupations. Even here, indeed, the concession is made that the community "will not be so stupid as to offer a wage below the level of efficiency"; but the principle of proportion to disagreeable effort (as if there were any absolute standard of this for all types) is regarded as coming nearest to ideal justice. Since the community is to own all the land and all the capital, the collectivist Inquisition will at any rate not fail for want of material power. In order to approximate to this ideal, Stuart is led to make a concession for which the best that can be said is that it is half-hearted. As a defender of the present order, he, of course, thinks inheritance and bequest favorable to industrial effort; but he allows Martin to draw up a compromise, in which property would be held by individual capitalists as em-

ployers of labor, but could not be bequeathed. Thus the kind of people who are "paralyzed by a competence" (p. 116) would disappear, and this would so far be favorable to industrial production. Whether it would be favorable to science or literature is not asked. What seems to be expected is that, since all would be educationally and socially equal, some who took the lowest rank industrially would "reserve their higher faculties for some creative work" when their routine work for a living was over. "Thus you might find a man who has chosen for his public and necessary task something disagreeable that others desire to shirk on condition of being allowed more leisure for pursuing scientific research or for writing poetry" (p. 184). Clearly, the society does not think these occupations sufficiently important to take anyone's whole time; or it is too invidious to allow this, because they are supposed to be delightful.

At the end of the account I have not been able to distinguish very clearly between Martin's own view and that which he tries to enforce on Stuart; but the result might have been expected. Modern plutocracy, systematized and deprived of all its anomalies, and collectivism, worked by the most competent industrials, would tend to coincide. The three types of community are described finally as having been set up "like beautiful statues"; but I must confess that I find no beauty in any of them. I quite agree with the author that "if an ideal is to result, an ideal must be willed"; and I am glad to think that, as he says, "justice is a power; and if it cannot create, it will at least destroy." Thus I am all the more disappointed not to be able to agree with any distinctive position adopted. I find neither true democracy nor true aristocracy (which are perhaps not incompatible) in the conception of the just order which he sets forth as the basis of collectivism. Is it not contradictory, for example, to speak of "adventitious natural advantages" (p. 100)? Yet it is on the ground that superiorities in strength or intelligence are "accidental gifts of nature" that the proposal is made in effect to penalize them. The view indeed is not consistently maintained; for Martin argues that, under Collectivism, there will remain as the stimulus to the able man the recognition of his services (p. 119). This certainly agrees better with what I take to be the common-sense view as regards personal merit. On the metaphysics of the question there might be some ultimate disagreement. With all

the disputation there has been on the problem of free-will and necessity, this question has scarcely been enough discussed; but for a decision on it and the application of that decision to individual cases I cannot think that collective society will ever be competent.

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IS IMMORTALITY DESIRABLE? By G. Lowes Dickinson. (The Ingersoll Lecture, 1908.) Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909. Pp. 63.

The author's main purpose in this lecture, as the title indicates, is to ask whether immortality, supposing it possible, is desirable, and to express his own opinion regarding the kind of immortality that one might rationally desire. At the opening of the lecture, and again at the close, however, he refers to the possibility of immortality, giving some general reasons why he considers it an open question whether or no it is a fact. "That the soul dies with the brain is an inference, and quite possibly a mistaken one. If to some minds it seems inevitable, that may be as much due to a defect of their imagination as to a superiority of their judgment. To infer wisely in such matters one must be a poet as well as a man of science" (p. 5). The spirit of Mr. Dickinson's discussion is, in general, indicated by this quotation. It is from the literary standpoint, and with frequent references to literature, that he deals with his topic, clothing his thoughts in the clear and charming prose that has delighted readers of his other books, and exhibiting everywhere sincerity and restraint in the expression of his opinions. These personal qualities are what give impressiveness to the lecture, and it is therefore not a little disconcerting to find the author turning at the end to 'psychical research' as a scientific means of deciding regarding survival after death, and adopting the familiar tone of censure against those who through prejudice and indifference are neglecting "a branch of scientific inquiry which may have results more important than any other that is being pursued in our time." To establish the fact of survival would not prove immortality, Mr. Dickinson admits; but he thinks that it would remove the principal objection against it. But would it tend to prove immortality desirable? On the